The Phantasmatic "I". On Imagination-based Uses of the First-person Pronoun across Fiction and Non-fiction by Dolcini, Nevia
  
RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA 
DOI: 10.4453/rifp.2016.0034   
 
ISSN 2039-4667; E-ISSN 2239-2629  
Vol. 7 (2016), n. 3, pp. 321-337 
 
 
 
The Phantasmatic “I”. On Imagination-based Uses of 
the First-person Pronoun across Fiction and Non-
fiction 
Nevia Dolcini(α)  
 
Ricevuto: 17 luglio 2015; accettato: 29 ottobre 2016 
 
 
 
█ Abstract Traditional accounts regard the first-person pronoun as a special token-reflexive indexical whose 
referent, the utterer, is identified by the linguistic rule expressed by the term plus the context of utterance. This 
view falls short in accounting for all the I-uses in narrative practices, a domain broader than fiction including 
storytelling, pretense, direct speech reports, delayed communication, the historical present, and any other lin-
guistic act in which the referent of the indexical is not perceptually accessible to the receiver. I propose a model 
for the reference of “I” based on the distinction between three functions carried out by indexicals in communi-
cation, namely, the anaphoric, perceptual, and phantasmatic functions. The referential mechanism of the phan-
tasmatic “I”, that is, the “I” used in phantasmatic function, is understood as an instance of imagination-oriented 
pointing exploiting the phantasmatic context, and not the perceptual context relevant in perceptual uses of in-
dexicals. The rule for “I” is revised in light of the perceptual vs. phantasmatic deixis distinction; the resulting 
rule governing the reference of the phantasmatic “I” allows for a homogeneous treatment of ‘I’-tokens in narra-
tive practices spanning the spectrum from fiction to non-fiction. 
KEYWORDS: First-person Pronoun; Context; Imagination; Fiction; Indexicals; Narration 
 
█ Riassunto L’io fantasmatico. Sull’uso immaginativo del pronome di prima persona tra finzione e realtà – Tradi-
zionalmente “io” viene trattato come un indicale token-riflessivo speciale il cui referente, il produttore 
dell’occorrenza, è identificato attraverso la sola regola linguistica e il contesto di proferimento. Questo approc-
cio, tuttavia, non riesce a rendere conto di quei casi in cui “io” appare all’interno di pratiche di narrazione, un 
dominio più ampio della finzione e che include lo storytelling, i racconti in discorso diretto e indiretto, la comu-
nicazione differita, il presente storico e ogni altro atto linguistico in cui il referente indicale non è percettiva-
mente accessibile al ricevente. Il modello per il riferimento di “io” qui proposto si basa sulla distinzione tra tre 
funzioni svolte dagli indicali nella comunicazione: la funzione anaforica, la funzione percettiva, e la funzione 
fantasmatica. Il meccanismo referenziale dell’io fantasmatico, ovvero del pronome di prima persona usato in 
funzione fantasmatica, è inteso come una istanza di deissi (o pointing) orientata dall’immaginazione che sfrutta 
il contesto fantasmatico, piuttosto che il contesto percettivo rilevante negli usi percettivi degli indicali. La regola 
per “io” è riformulata alla luce della distinzione tra deissi fantasmatica e deissi percettiva; la risultante regola per 
il riferimento indicale dell’io fantasmatico permette un trattamento omogeneo delle occorrenze di “io” nelle 
pratiche di narrazione che pertengono indistintamente alla finzione e alla realtà. 
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█ The chameleon and the octopus 
 
THE FIRST-PERSON PRONOUN HAS attracted 
special attention, and because of its potential 
relation to the notions of self, personal identity, 
mind, and consciousness, interest in the “I” ex-
tends well beyond philosophy to, in particular, 
psychology. The term “I” is one of numerous 
linguistic tools that belong to the wide category 
of indexicals, which includes other personal 
pronouns (“you”, “we”, “she”…), demonstrative 
pronouns (“this”, “that”…), possessive adjec-
tives (“my”, “your”…), adverbs (“tomorrow”, 
“here”, “now”…), and adjectives (“past”, “pre-
sent”…).1 The special status of indexicals con-
sists in their capacity to select items in dis-
course, in the actual context in which the 
communication occurs, and even items of 
thought. Indeed, indexicals are context-sensitive 
expressions, as their referent may shift from 
context to context. Along with definite descrip-
tions (“the 45th President of the United States”), 
and proper names (“Donald Trump”), indexi-
cals are singular terms that hook on to a unique 
referent – usually, yet not exclusively, an indi-
vidual or a ‘thing’ in the world - by exploiting 
the context of use. Yet, unlike definite descrip-
tions and proper names, indexical expressions 
(e.g., “he has dyed-blonde comb-over hair”) es-
sentially require a context to disambiguate their 
reference.  
Since its very onset, analytic philosophy 
has laid special emphasis on the analysis of 
indexicals, and this philosophical attraction 
to indexicals is widely motivated by semantic 
concerns, as well as issues of a metaphysical 
kind. Incidentally, semantic and metaphysi-
cal concerns cannot easily be disentangled 
from one another, in as much as semantic 
analysis might also be understood as a tool 
for revealing something essential about the 
metaphysical status of the entities referred to 
by language, while metaphysical assumptions 
can be tested by means of linguistic analysis. 
Philosophers have long been puzzled by the 
resistance to formalization exhibited by in-
dexicals, as they cannot be easily accommo-
dated by a semantic theory of linguistic ref-
erence.2 The numerous attempts to account 
for indexical reference mainly entail either 
the enhancement of formal languages via 
creation of specialized formal languages able 
to capture some of its characteristics, or by 
establishing ways to implement pragmatic 
elements, such as pointing gestures,3 or the 
speaker’s intention4 in semantic models.  
The Latin term “index” (from which “in-
dexical” derives) means “clue”, “sign”, or “in-
dex finger”, thus revealing one shared feature 
of the whole linguistic category: indexicals 
primarily function as linguistic indexes, or 
linguistic pointers. By analogy to pointing ges-
tures,5 indexical terms are quite effective in 
drawing the interlocutors’ attention towards 
a specific object or event within the context 
in which the indexical is uttered. For exam-
ple, anytime the expression “It is raining 
here” is uttered, the indexical “here” refers to 
the place in which that particular token of 
“here” is uttered. Thus, “here” may refer to 
Macau if I am the speaker and it is the case 
that I am in Macau at the time of the utter-
ance, or it may refer to any other place where 
the speaker of the “here”-token happens to 
be. As a result, the success of indexical com-
munication greatly depends on the degree to 
which the context of utterance is shared with 
the interlocutors, whose capacity to success-
fully identify the reference of “here” follows 
from what they know about the speaker’s lo-
cation at the time of the indexical utterance. 
Apparently, the referential mechanism of 
indexicals depends on the surrounding con-
text in which they occur, and for this reason 
they have also been labeled “chameleonic” ex-
pressions, seeing that «like a chameleon 
whose colors depends on the surroundings, 
these words change their denotation from 
context to context».6 Typically, the relevant 
surroundings are characterized in terms of 
context of utterance, that is, the concrete and 
actual context in which the communication 
event takes place. Features constituting the 
context of utterance might include, among 
others, spatio-temporal coordinates, interloc-
utors, speaker’s intentions, and pointing ges-
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tures accompanying the indexical utterance.  
In addition to this, it is widely assumed 
that the indexical token is an essential con-
stituent of linguistic meaning expressed by 
the indexical. For example, “here” means the 
place in which the “here”-token occurs, and 
this rule captures the common intuition that 
“here” has different referents in different 
contexts. The idea that the rules for deter-
mining an indexical reference are token-
reflexive, that is, they include the indexical-
token itself, traces back to Reichenbach: “I” 
is defined as the person who utters this token 
of “I’’, “now” as the time at which this token 
of “now” is uttered, and so on. The analogy 
between chameleons and indexicals is based 
on their behavior with respect to the context; 
the context of utterance is to the indexical 
token what the surroundings are to the cha-
meleon, and as the surroundings of the cha-
meleon determine its colors, in the same way 
the context of utterance determines the ref-
erence of the indexical token.  
Along these lines, “I” is a chameleonic term 
in the sense that its context-sensitivity allows 
it to be used by each speaker to refer to her-
self, that is, to the utterer of the “I” token. 
Note that the utterer is not only designated 
as the speaker, but more generally as the 
“agent”, since the I-token can be produced 
without the involvement of spoken language 
as in the case of a written indexical state-
ment. It is commonly assumed that in typical 
uses, given the token-reflexive linguistic rule 
and the context of utterance, the first person 
pronoun cannot possibly be a vacuous name, 
because it never lacks a referent. This result 
stems from the view that the semantic evalu-
ation of indexical expressions strictly de-
pends upon features and parameters of the 
context, where the context can generally be 
defined as follows:  
 
In the semantically relevant sense, a con-
text is the repository of the sort of infor-
mation required by the conventional 
meaning of indexicals in the language. So, 
for instance, if we agree that “I” is an in-
dexical expression that refers to different 
individuals depending on (negotiably) 
who is speaking, then a context appropri-
ate for the interpretation of a fragment 
containing (the formal counterpart of) “I” 
must supply what is commonly called an 
“agent” or a “speaker”. Similarly, any con-
text appropriate for the interpretation of 
a language that also includes expressions 
corresponding to “now” and “here” must 
be able to identify, together with an agent, 
also a time and a place. Contexts may be 
then represented by n-tuples containing 
required parameters, as in the usual for-
mat c = [ct, cl, …].7 
 
Agent, time and place are expected to be 
necessary features of any context of utter-
ance, and unlike “this” or “that”, which in 
typical uses need the recourse to pragmatic 
features of the context (speakers’ intentions 
or pointing gestures), “I” seems to be non-
ambiguous, given that the context of utter-
ance plus the linguistic rule is enough for fix-
ing the reference. Indeed, while there might 
be many referent candidates for an occur-
rence of “this” or “there”, it makes sense to 
assume that there can be only just one indi-
vidual who is the utterer of a specific token 
of “I”. In other words, the first-person pro-
noun is non-ambiguous.8 
The traditional view of the first-person 
pronoun’s referential mechanism has been 
challenged mainly for the reason that, appar-
ently, it cannot accommodate atypical cases 
in which the referent of “I” seems to differ 
from the utterer of the I-token,9 therefore 
leaving the question of how the reference of 
“I” is determined open. Scenarios in which 
the “I” fails to refer to the utterer, or agent, 
include post-it written notes, recorded mes-
sages, figurative I-uses, and I-sentences refer-
ring to a group of people. The criticism rang-
es from a firm rejection of the whole stand-
ard definition of indexicals as context-
dependent and governed by token-reflexive 
rules, to various proposals of revised versions 
of the standard kaplanian model.10 Also, the-
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ories of indexical reference have sometimes 
been tested on data from fictional discourse, 
and therefore confronted with the ontological 
and metaphysical issues that pertain to fic-
tional objects, or alternatively the notion of 
fiction and the imaginary have been employed 
to characterize the relevant context in fiction-
al uses of indexicals.11 In this work I will dis-
cuss a set of data, which is not limited to fic-
tional discourse, but also includes all the other 
non-fictional I-uses occurring in narrative 
practices. The analysis will reveal some of the 
limits of the context of utterance as tradition-
ally intended. In particular, the discussion of I-
uses in narrative practices will point out why 
such contexts cannot account for the first-
person pronoun referential mechanism, nor 
for indexical reference tout court.  
The idea that traditional approaches to in-
dexical reference seem to fail to capture the 
entire range of functions executed by indexi-
cals in communication is not new, yet my pro-
posal introduces some original features to the 
debate, such as the distinction between differ-
ent functions performed by indexicals in 
communication. Also, the employed taxono-
my of indexical discourse, with its distinction 
between narrative uses vs. non narrative uses 
of indexicals, overcomes the boundaries of the 
traditional categories usually employed in the 
literature on indexicals, such as, among others, 
fictional indexicals, and present tenses.12 In-
deed, I consider the domain of narrative prac-
tices to be broader than the domain of fiction, 
as it also includes storytelling, pretense, direct 
speech reports, plays, delayed communication, 
the historical present, and any other linguistic 
act in which the referent of the indexical is not 
perceptually accessible to the receiver.  
The common feature in narrative practic-
es is that communication is not about what is 
actually present in the context of utterance, 
but is rather about what is not there. In such 
circumstances, I will argue, the employed in-
dexicals appear to behave more like mimic 
octopuses than chameleons: when the first-
person pronoun is employed in a piece of fic-
tion, in storytelling, in pretense-play, or in an 
actor performance, the term displays a func-
tional plasticity that resembles the amazing 
behavior of the mimic octopus,13 a creature 
capable of strategically impersonating other 
species commonly found in its environment. 
The mimic octopus changes its skin color 
and texture in order to blend in with the en-
vironment, and it also adds to such chamele-
onic skills the capacity to copy and reproduce 
the behavior and shape of a wide variety of 
animals such as, among others, crabs, jelly-
fishes, and flatfishes. Thus, the first-person 
pronoun, thanks to its octopusian talents, 
quite naturally refers to either the utterer or 
some other individual other than the utterer. 
In fact, within the domain of narrative 
practices the referent of the first-person pro-
noun cannot be determined by its concrete 
surroundings, given that such surroundings 
are only there by means of imagination: the 
context is just imagined, not actually per-
ceived. Because of the irrelevance of the sur-
roundings in the case of “I” uses in narrative 
practices, the analogy with the chameleon 
becomes obsolete, yet the octpusian indexical 
changes its reference depending on its mimic 
strategy, which is tailored to the imagination-
based context in which it appears. 
In the next section, I make a distinction 
originally proposed by Karl Bühler, between 
three different ways in which indexicals can 
be used in communication. The three modes 
of deixis, namely, the anaphoric mode, the 
perceptual mode, and the phantasmatic 
mode, relate to different contexts. I briefly 
discuss the nature of the relevant contexts for 
fixing the referent of indexicals used in the 
three different modes, and I introduce the 
notions of perceptual context and phantas-
matic context, which are accessible via per-
ception and via imagination, respectively. 
Further I provide a discussion of the tradi-
tional approach to indexicals, in particular, 
the first-person pronoun. In such approach-
es, token-reflexivity grounds the indexicals’ 
context-sensitivity, and the context of utter-
ance is regarded as a key ingredient in their 
referential mechanism; yet, I argue, the con-
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text of utterance as traditionally understood 
is insensitive to the different modes of deixis 
and to the functions operated by “I” in com-
munication. I therefore propose two rules, 
which easily accommodate the different 
needs of perceptual deixis and phantasmatic 
deixis. The rules, while compatible with the 
traditional account of indexical reference, 
avoid any appeal to notions such as inten-
tionality, conventionality, and pretense, 
while providing a framework for the various 
uses of indexicals, and their employment in 
narrative practices, in particular. Finally, I 
consider three different sorts of linguistic I-
data from narrative practices of both the 
non-fictional and fictional kind. The analysis 
of these three cases suggests that the mecha-
nism underlying the understanding of the I-
token is insensitive to the fictional vs. non-
fiction distinction. The token-reflexive rule 
for the phantasmatic “I” exploits the phan-
tasmatic context, and accounts for indexical 
communication in all those cases in which 
imagination, but not perception, is at work. 
The provided analysis unveils some of the 
mechanisms governing the use of the first-
person pronoun in narrations, while high-
lighting the elements of continuity with its 
use in fiction as well as non-fiction.  
 
█  Three modes of deixis 
 
In fictional works and other narrative 
practices, we make a massive recourse to in-
dexicals much as we do outside fiction and 
narration. However, essential differences be-
tween the mechanism underlying indexicals 
in the two distinct communicative modalities 
are in place. Very generally, one can think of 
such a difference in terms of the presence vs. 
absence of the indexical’s referent in the con-
text in which the communicative event oc-
curs. To offer a clearer explanation of the 
various functions achieved by indexicals in 
communication, it is useful to appeal to the 
core aspects of the pragmatic view of indexi-
cal expressions provided by Karl Bühler. In 
his Sprachtheorie (Bühler 1934),14 he offers an 
original study of indexical uses within the 
framework of the so-called “two-field theo-
ry”, in which he combines the results from 
linguistics, mainly from the contributions of 
Wegener15 and Brugmann,16 with those from 
psychology. In particular, Bühler appeals to 
Brentano’s tradition of descriptive psycholo-
gy, and its applications to the study of lan-
guage along the lines of Anton Marty’s phi-
losophy of language. 
It is unfortunate that the two-field theory 
has been given little recognition over the last 
century in the philosophy of language;17 in 
fact, among its numerous merits, the two-field 
theory outlines a compelling distinction be-
tween three modes of deixis:18 the anaphoric 
mode, or “text deixis” in Bühler’s terminology, 
the ocular demonstration mode also called 
“real deixis”, or “demonstratio ad oculos et ad 
aures”, and the imagination-oriented mode or 
“deixis am phantasma”. With these distinc-
tions, Bühler intends to identify the three 
ways in which indexicals absolve their primary 
function of orienting the interlocutors’ atten-
tion – in their respective different roles of 
producer/receiver19 – to something, that is, to 
the indexical’s referent. 
In the anaphoric mode of pointing, the 
indexical term orients the interlocutors’ at-
tention to a single antecedent or postcedent 
grammatical or lexical item, such as a noun 
or a phrase in the discourse or text under 
consideration. For example, given the state-
ment “John loves ice-cream; strawberry is his 
favorite flavor”, the term “his” points to the 
proper name “John”, where the referent of 
the pronoun depends on the referent of the 
noun.20 Whereas the anaphoric pointing di-
rects the interlocutors’ attention within the 
space of the discourse (or text), the domains 
of demonstrative and imagination-oriented 
pointing are the space of perception and the 
space of imagination, respectively. Bühler’s 
three modes of deixis have not been given 
equal attention by contemporary philoso-
phers, with the imagination-oriented deixis 
being by far the least discussed. Taking 
Bühler’s distinction as the starting point, I 
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will offer a more fine-grained description of 
the space of perception and the space of im-
agination; the two notions, I will argue, pro-
vide the basis for defining the relevant con-
texts for using indexicals in their demonstra-
tive and imagination-oriented functions. 
The demonstrative mode (demonstratio 
ad oculos) is also called by Bühler “factual 
pointing”, and it occurs any time a speaker 
refers, by means of indexical terms, to an ob-
ject or event, or to its properties or relations, 
which belong to the actual and concrete con-
text of communication. This mode is in place 
whenever we speak about perceived things, 
which are perceptually accessible to the inter-
locutors as well. Here “perception” is broadly 
understood as the faculty of perceiving or 
apprehending by means of the senses, and it 
also includes other sensory phenomena such 
as time perception. Therefore, I regard the 
demonstrative mode as a perceptual deixis, 
and I call “perceptual indexical” any indexical 
term employed in a perceptual mode. Note 
that, for an effective use of perceptual index-
icals, it is not enough for the indexical refer-
ent to be physically present in the actual con-
text of the utterance, it must also be per-
ceived by the subjects engaged in the com-
municative event, or at least it must be in 
principle perceivable for the indexical com-
munication act to be felicitous. For example, 
let’s consider the case of someone who utters 
“This chair needs to be fixed” addressing her 
nearby interlocutor, while another person 
overhearing the utterance from behind a 
closed door is located in a different room. 
Given the speaker’s use of “this” in perceptu-
al mode, the person beyond the door is pre-
vented from perceptually accessing the bro-
ken chair, and as a result she is prevented 
from successfully identifying the indexical 
referent: the broken chair is indeed an item 
“physically” constituting the context, yet it is 
nevertheless out of the space of perception, 
which is the relevant context when it comes 
to perceptual deixis.  
In perceptual deixis, the interlocutors 
share the field of perception,21 roughly corre-
sponding to the sum of all the areas made ac-
cessible to the subject via different sensory 
modalities (visual, auditory, tactile, etc.). The 
field of perception is peculiar to each indi-
vidual, and therefore necessarily different 
and distinct for every interlocutor engaged in 
the communicative event. Felicitous em-
ployments of perceptual deixis occur when 
speakers expect the indexical’s referent to fall 
within the field of perception of their inter-
locutors. Let’s imagine a couple are listening 
to Donald Trump giving a speech on TV, 
and one of them says “We should both dye 
our hair like his”: the success of the commu-
nicative event depends on the interlocutors’ 
perceptual access to the indexical referent 
(the image of Donald Trump on the TV 
screen) and therefore to the shared portion 
of their perceptual fields in which is located, 
among other things, the indexical referent.  
Thus, the relevant context for perceptual 
indexicals is not the individual perceptual 
field, but rather the locus of intersection of 
the perceptual fields of the interlocutors en-
gaged in the communication event. I call per-
ceptual context the locus of intersection of 
individual perceptual fields.22 In the percep-
tual mode of pointing, indexicals function as 
a linguistic means for directing the interlocu-
tors’ attention towards an element comprised 
in the space of perception, which I have bet-
ter defined as the perceptual context.  
The third mode of pointing is the imagi-
nation-oriented deixis, also called deixis am 
phantasma, and I will address the indexicals 
used under this mode as phantasmatic indexi-
cals, which are employed when speakers refer 
to “absent” things. In striking contrast with 
the perceptual mode, phantasmatic indexi-
cals refer to objects or events not perceptual-
ly accessible in the circumstances in which 
the utterance takes place, or not perceptually 
accessible in principle and per se. It is not 
surprising that in fictional works, pretense-
play, and narrations, among other cases, 
most indexicals are used in imagination-
oriented mode, and in fact indexicals em-
ployed in narrative practices do not refer to 
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anything directly perceivable by the interloc-
utors – either in the role of sender or receiver 
– nor are the phantasmatic indexicals’ refer-
ents to be found anywhere in the perceptual 
context. Here is Bühler’s sketch of imagina-
tion-oriented deixis:  
 
The matter changes with one blow, it 
seems, when the narrator leads the hearer 
into the realm of what is absent and can be 
remembered or into the realm of construc-
tive imagination and treats him to the same 
deictic words as before so that he may see 
and hear what can be seen and heard there 
 Not with the external eye, ear, and so 
on, but with what is usually called the 
mind’s eye or ear in everyday language.23 
 
According to Bühler, imagination-oriented 
deixis is better understood in the light of the 
“theory of visualization or mental imagery” 
(Vorstellungslehre), an out of fashion expression 
that nevertheless contains a valuable idea: the 
analysis of indexicals and their referential 
mechanism would benefit from the study of 
human imagination, memory, and constructive 
phantasy. Whereas perceptual indexicals point 
to things within the perceptual context, the ori-
entation and pointing of phantasmatic indexi-
cals happen within an imagined space, which 
Bühler views as «the realm of the somewhere 
or other pure phantasy, the realm of the here 
and there of memory».24  
Although two entirely different types of 
contexts are activated in the process of iden-
tifying the referent of an indexical term used 
in either perceptual or phantasmatic mode, 
phantasmatic indexicals still share their natu-
ral cues with perceptual indexicals, as Bühler 
illustrates with the actor on stage example:  
 
the speaker and the hearer of a visual de-
scription of something absent possess the 
same talent and resources that permit the 
actor on the stage to make something that 
is absent present and which permit the 
audience to interpret what is presented on 
the stage as a mimesis of something ab-
sent. The language used for “perceptual” 
things is completely adapted to his fic-
tional play, and language should only be 
called perceptual to the extent that it uses 
its resources.25 
 
The common referential mechanism of per-
ceptual indexicals and phantasmatic indexicals, 
as well as the features shared by perceptual con-
text and imagination-based context, suggest 
that the two modes are on a continuum. 
Imagination-oriented pointing takes place 
within the space of imagination, which I will 
call phantasmatic context,26 and the referent 
of the phantasmatic indexical is to be found 
within this space. Note that the distinction 
between perceptual indexicals (demonstra-
tive pointing) and phantasmatic indexicals 
(imagination-oriented pointing) is fully in-
dependent of fictional vs. non-fictional, ex-
istent vs. non-existent, or fictional vs. actual 
distinctions. In fact, whether the imagined 
object is a mental representation totally de-
pendent on phantasy, or the memory of a 
concrete, existent and actual object, it is still 
accessible only via imagination,27 and not ac-
cessible via actual perception. In fact, the 
modality (perception vs. imagination) by 
which subjects access the indexical’s referent 
– at the time of the utterance – constitutes 
the criterion for distinguishing between “per-
ceived object” and “imagined object”.  
The distinction between indexical uses 
with perceptual, phantasmatic, and anaphoric 
functions can be taken as one of the cues for 
clarifying the nature of the relation between 
“language” and “reference”.28 Perceptual in-
dexicals and phantasmatic indexicals both 
seem to reveal whether the communication is 
about what is presently perceived by the inter-
locutors, or what is not presently perceived, 
but rather (just) imagined. In the first case, 
the indexical referent is an object or event 
perceptually accessible to the interlocutors, 
whereas in the latter the indexical referent is 
not accessible via perception, but is “imag-
ined” and/or “recalled” from memory. In a 
conversation, typically, indexicals are used in 
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both of these modes depending on whether 
their referent belongs to the perceptual con-
text or to the phantasmatic context. Most of 
the philosophical literature about indexicals 
revolves around the ways in which non-
perceptual uses can be addressed by means of 
context shifts, dual contexts, or by intention-
ality-based accounts in which the speakers’ 
referential intentions determine the refer-
ence of the indexical. 
In contrast to these tentative solutions, my 
proposal takes a different path by assuming 
Bühler’s pragmatic functional distinction as 
the starting point for an analysis of indexical 
communication. Such an approach has the 
main advantage of reframing a wide class of 
traditionally distinguished cases (pretense, 
storytelling, fictional uses, the historical pre-
sent, etc.) under the homogeneous category of 
the phantasmatic use of indexicals. As a result, 
we find that phantasmatic indexicals are per-
vasive in both fictional as well as non-fictional 
discourse; we use them when touring a city for 
the first time and asking for directions, or 
when we speak about people and events which 
are not actually “there” (that is, not features of 
the context of utterance), and in many other 
occasions where what we are talking about is 
not accessible via perception. The use of 
phantasmatic indexicals stems from and de-
pends upon the human imaginative capacity 
to mentally represent what is not there yet or 
anymore, what does not exist, what is created 
or imagined by phantasy, as well as what we 
pretend. Given that both fictional and non-
fictional narrations typically occur when the 
narrator’s discourse is about what is not pre-
sent to the audience’s29 actual perception, nar-
rative practices constitute the natural locus for 
phantasmatic indexicals: characters, places, 
and events portrayed in narrations are only 
accessible via imagination.  
 
█  “I” and context 
 
The first-person pronoun, along with “now” 
and “here”, is typically considered a special in-
dexical as the linguistic rule plus the context of 
utterance is enough to fix the reference. In con-
trast, the context of utterance does not seem to 
resolve the intrinsic semantic ambiguity of 
demonstratives such as “this” or “that”, and 
other indexicals, for which recourse to contex-
tual pragmatic features, such as accompanying 
demonstrations, or speakers’ intentions may be 
needed. For this reason, it is commonly accept-
ed that the category of indexicals lacks seman-
tic homogeneity, and that we should distin-
guish between pure indexicals, such as “I”, 
“here”, and “now”, and demonstratives. It is also 
suggested by Perry, among others, that in addi-
tion to its non-ambiguity, the pure indexical “I” 
is “automatic” as well, in the sense that the lin-
guistic rule for the first-person pronoun 
(roughly, “I” refers to the I-token utterer) de-
termines its referent automatically. Elsewhere,30 
I have endorsed a more radical view according 
to which the automaticity of the first person 
pronoun suggests its semantic heterogeneity 
vis-à-vis the entire indexical category.31 Such a 
perspective on the “I” is well expressed by Hec-
tor-Neri Castañeda’s claim that «a correct use 
of I cannot fail to refer to the entity to which it 
purports to refer; moreover, a correct use of I 
cannot fail to pick up the category of the entity 
to which it refers».32 These reflections about 
the “I” and its special place in communication 
directly stem from the view, first adduced by 
Reichenbach, that indexicals are token-reflexive 
words. “Token-reflexivity” is about the specific 
referential mechanism guiding indexical com-
munication: indexicals «refer to corresponding 
tokens33 used in individual acts of speech or 
writing».34 So, the meaning of a token i of the 
indexical “I”(Im) is a descriptive content,35 
which can be expressed as follows: 
 
Im: the utterer of this I-token.  
 
When “I” is uttered in an act of speech, 
because of its token-reflexivity it invariably 
refers to the utterer of that particular I-token. 
Equally, in the case of a written token of “I”, 
it refers to the writer (producer) of that par-
ticular I-token. Token-reflexivity exactly 
captures the idea that indexical statements 
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cannot be truth-conditionally evaluated at 
the level of sentence-type, but rather they 
must be evaluated as tokens.36 In this respect, 
indexicals differ significantly from co-
referential singular terms whose referential 
mechanism is independent from the context 
of utterance, such as definite descriptions 
(“the 45th President of the United States”), 
and proper names (“Donald Trump”).  
Moreover, indexical token-reflexivity evo-
kes the Peircean idea that sign-indexes signify 
in virtue of existential relations, also under-
stood as causal or spatio-temporal relations, 
thus anchoring their meaning to exact features 
of the surroundings – alias the context of ut-
terance – in which the token occurs. Token-
reflexivity boosts context-sensitivity, and the-
se two features are what essentially make in-
dexicals chameleonic terms. However, these 
features also dissipate any ambiguity when it 
comes to the first-person pronoun: given the 
meaning of an I-token plus the context of ut-
terance, the referential mechanism of the I-
token does not require supplementary demon-
stration, as the referent of the I-token, that is, 
the utterer of the I-token, is itself a feature of 
the context of utterance. 
Context-sensitivity, token-reflexivity, au-
tomaticity, and the non-ambiguity of the 
first-person pronoun is captured in the for-
mula (RI) offered below, where “I” is the I-
token, “CU” is the context of utterance, and 
“tI” is the time at which “I” is uttered: 
 
(RI)  Rule for “I”: Every occurrence of I re-
fers to the individual that is the utterer 
in CU at tI. 
 
Due to its general tone, RI is insensitive to 
the distinction previously provided between 
the three modes of deixis. Yet, the employ-
ment of the context of utterance makes RI 
more compatible with perceptual uses of in-
dexicals than with phantasmatic uses. When 
“I” is used in a perceptual function, the inter-
locutors have perceptual access to its referent, 
which is an element of the context of utter-
ance (the utterer). However, CU is still not the 
same notion as the perceptual context. In or-
der to tailor RI to perceptual indexicals and 
phantasmatic indexicals, the notion of the 
context of utterance requires further revision. 
More importantly, RI is not applicable to 
phantasmatic uses of the “I”, so that it falls 
short in accounting for the indexicality of 
narrative practices. For example, let’s consid-
er the actor on the stage uttering “How 
should I your true love know” while playing 
Ophelia: given the specific CU in this case, RI 
will pick up as referent of the I-token the ac-
tor herself (the utterer of the I-token), rather 
than Ophelia. Such a result is obviously and 
intuitively defective, yet it’s the red flag that 
the notion of CU, as well as pragmatic aspects 
of indexical uses, must be reconsidered.  
Let’s then revise RI in light of the distinc-
tion, previously discussed, between perceptual 
and phantasmatic deixis, and their respective 
relevant contexts, that is, perceptual context 
(CPER) and phantasmatic context (CPHA). If “IP-
ER” is the I-token used in the perceptual mode, 
and “IPHA” is the I-token used in phantasmatic 
mode, RI can be adapted as follows: 
 
(RIPER)  Rule for “IPER”: Every occurrence of 
IPER refers to the individual that is the 
utterer in CPER at tIPER. 
 
(RIPHA)  Rule for “IPHA”: Every occurrence of 
IPHA refers to the individual that is 
the utterer in CPHA at tIPHA. 
 
The two revised rules are tailored to the 
different uses of the first-person pronoun in 
communication, yet they have a common 
structure indicative of the relevant features 
at work in both perceptual deixis and phan-
tasmatic deixis.  
In particular, RIPHA perfectly adapts to the 
phantasmatic “I” employed in narrative prac-
tices, and its application does not produce 
defective results like that noted above with 
respect to the case of the actor: the actor’s 
use of the first-person pronoun in “How 
should I your true love know” is phantasmat-
ic, therefore the relevant context is CPHA, ra-
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ther than CU. By applying RIPHA, and given 
the specific CPHA, the referent of the I-token 
used in phantasmatic mode (IPHA) is the fic-
tional character Ophelia.  
 
█  The phantasmatic “I” through fiction and 
non-fiction 
 
Narrations are crowded with indexicals. 
Yet, the context of utterance is fully irrele-
vant for almost all the indexicals used in nar-
rative practices, as they are employed for 
talking about people, objects, and events spa-
tio-temporally out of, or far from our current 
experience. Phantasy and imagination play a 
central role in the process of creating a story, 
as well as in the production and interpreta-
tion of phantasmatic indexicals providing the 
spatio-temporal architectonic structure of 
narrations, thus allowing us to move through 
the story.  
A pragmatic look at indexical communica-
tion in narrative practices may reveal that 
phantasmatic deixis is fully disentangled from 
fictionality: the phantasmatic “I” invariably 
maintains its function and mechanism whether 
it occurs in fictional or in non-fictional dis-
courses. In other words, fictionality is not es-
sential to phantasmatic deixis. Authors of fic-
tional narrations create non-actual scenarios, 
which the audience re-creates by means of im-
agination. Similarly, in non-fictional narrations 
the narrator describes and reports on events, 
facts, and people, which despite being absent to 
her current perception, are currently actual, or 
have been actual in the past. Independently of 
the current actuality or non-actuality of what 
the narration is about, the audience still relies 
on imagination for (re-)creating and mentally 
representing the content of narration, to which 
there is no perceptual access. 
When “I” occurs in non-fictional narra-
tions, the audience usually takes it to refer to 
the producer of the I-token, which might be 
a fictional character from the story, or a real 
individual, depending on the situation. How-
ever, people’s common attitude towards the 
phantasmatic “I” reflects a quite natural and 
pre-reflective tendency to relate the first-
person pronoun to a “self” of some sort. This 
tendency is part of the more general anti-
solipsistic urge of attributing a self to others, 
as we per default perceive ourselves as sur-
rounded by creatures reasonably akin to our-
selves, who might possibly, yet not necessari-
ly, turn into dialogical interlocutors. The 
phantasmatic “I” in fictional as well as non-
fictional narrations, with the compliance of 
our natural psychological tendencies, triggers 
the intuition that a self is speaking, or that 
the narration is about a self. Sometimes nar-
rations of facts and events from one’s own 
life come in the form of confessions and au-
tobiographies delivered from the first-person 
perspective,37 as in the case of Augustine’s 
Confessions. Often, narrations are a mixture 
of veridical narration and pure phantasy, yet 
the veridical vs. phantasmatic distinction is 
inessential to the reader’s understanding of 
language, and when perception cannot be 
exploited, she is still able to navigate the nar-
ration thanks to imagination.  
Indeed, imagination is the essential fea-
ture of narrative practices: it is activated 
when the narrator engages in her creative ac-
tivity of conveying a story, and it is massively 
at work in the audience as well. As shown in 
RIPHA, the phantasmatic context is the rele-
vant domain for the phantasmatic “I”, 
whether the narrative practice is fictional or 
not. This is not to say that readers do not 
take the actual world into consideration 
while reading a work of fiction, or that they 
don’t distinguish between the real and the 
imaginary: many, and sometimes all of the 
scenarios and events in the fictional narra-
tion, echo and mirror aspects of the actual 
world. Landscapes, cities, and ideally any el-
ement from the actual world might appear in 
a work of fiction.  
However, RIPHA highlights the following 
phenomenon: phantasmatic indexicals ena-
ble us to comprehend and navigate through 
fictional and non-fictional scenarios by acti-
vating the very same imagination-based 
mechanism. By overcoming the difficulties 
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posed by the traditional token-reflexive rule 
for “I”, the revised rule largely fits the needs 
of narrative practices, and aims at offering an 
explanatory model for phantasmatic deixis.  
In the following, I analyze three different 
cases of the phantasmatic “I” from both fic-
tional and non-fictional narrations. The first 
case is from a fictional work, The Adventures of 
Pinocchio, where the phantasmatic “I” refers to 
a speaking wooden puppet. In the second case, 
the analysis focuses on an excerpt from a novel, 
The Late Mattia Pascal, in which Mattia fea-
tures as the main fictional character. Finally, 
the third case is an example of non-fictional 
narration from Charles Darwin’s diaries. 
 
█ Case 1: Pinocchio 
 
Right at the end of Carlo Collodi’s The 
Adventures of Pinocchio, and after the wood-
en puppet Pinocchio has been turned into a 
real boy, he reflects on his identity in a dia-
logue with his father: 
 
“I wonder where the old Pinocchio of 
wood has hidden himself?” “There he is” 
answered Geppetto. And he pointed to a 
large Marionette leaning against a chair, 
head turned to one side, arms hanging 
limp, and legs twisted under him. After a 
long, long look, Pinocchio said to himself 
with great content: “How ridiculous I was 
as a Marionette! And how happy I am, 
now that I have become a real boy!”38  
 
The story is narrated from the third-
person perspective, and direct speech is em-
ployed. Obviously, any reader would take 
those I-occurrences to refer to Pinocchio. In 
fact, in the fictional story the narrator (Collo-
di) makes his narratee, Pinocchio, the utterer 
of these I-tokens. Such triviality is underrepre-
sented by RI, which strictly interpreted says 
that every occurrence of “I” refers to the indi-
vidual that is the utterer in CU at tI, that is, the 
producer of the I-tokens, Carlo Collodi. Once 
agreed that in narrative practices the first-
person pronoun is used in phantasmatic 
mode, RIPHA offers a satisfactory explanation 
of the referential mechanism at work with 
each of the phantasmatic “I”s at issue.  
 
█ Case 2: Mattia Pascal 
 
These are the first two lines of The Late 
Mattia Pascal, a novel by Luigi Pirandello in 
which the main fictional character Mattia 
narrates his adventures from the first person 
perspective:  
 
One of the few things, in fact about the on-
ly thing I was sure of was my name: Mattia 
Pascal. Of this I took full advantage also.39  
 
Also in this case, RI is not up to the job of 
identifying Mattia as the referent of the I-
tokens. Yet, the I-tokens are further instanc-
es of the phantasmatic “I”, and by applying 
RIPHA Mattia is picked up as the referent for 
all of the occurrences of “I” in the text. Given 
that the story is narrated from the first-
person perspective, unlike Case 1, one might 
doubt – if not otherwise notified – that The 
Late Mattia Pascal is an autobiography, indi-
cating that the story is written by Mattia Pas-
cal, who is both the author and the protago-
nist of the story.  
This would trigger one of the traditional 
puzzles discussed by philosophers about fic-
tional discourse and reference. The en-
dorsement of the pragmatic distinction be-
tween anaphoric, perceptual, and phantas-
matic deixis, might help avoid this issue 
without the need to distinguish between fic-
tion and non-fiction. In fact, the exploitation 
of the phantasmatic context makes the refer-
ential mechanism of the phantasmatic “I” in-
sensitive to the distinction between fiction 
and non-fiction. 
 
█ Case 3: Charles Darwin 
 
The third example is offered by The Voy-
age of the Beagle, in which Charles Darwin 
narrates his observations in natural history 
and geology. On his second survey expedi-
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tion on the Beagle he writes:  
 
I may mention one very trifling anecdote, 
which at that time struck me more forcibly 
than any story of cruelty. I was crossing a 
ferry with a Negro, who was uncommonly 
stupid. In endeavoring to make him under-
stand, I talked loud and made signs, in do-
ing which I passed my hand near his face. 
He, I suppose, thought I was in a passion, 
and was going to strike him; for instantly, 
with a frightened look and half-shut eyes, 
he dropped his hands. I shall never forget 
my feelings of surprise, disgust, and shame 
at seeing a great, powerful man afraid even 
to ward off a blow, directed, as he thought, 
at his face. This man had been trained to a 
degradation lower than the slavery of the 
most helpless animal.40 
 
Darwin narrates his memories and reflec-
tions in the form of a travel memoir from the 
first-person perspective. In non-fictional works 
of that sort, as well as in autobiographies, nar-
rator and narratee are one and the same: the 
writer refers to himself with the use of “I”.  
In this third case, RI identifies Darwin as 
the referent of the I-token, however this rule 
cannot discriminate between Case 2 and 
Case 3. Yet, RIPHA still works in this case (as 
well as in the case of autobiographies or self-
reports) by picking up the correct referent. 
One of the advantages of RIPHA, is that it ho-
mogeneously applies to all cases in which the 
referent of an I-token is not perceptually ac-
cessible (as here exemplified by the scenarios 
in Case 1, Case 2, and Case 3).  
The most common criticism of the tradi-
tional view of indexical reference is that it 
does not work well with fictional discourse, 
or that it does not homogeneously account 
for indexical data across fiction and non-
fiction. In fiction, narrator and narratee seem 
to dwell in two separate and distinct worlds, 
the real world and the fictional world, which 
do not meddle with each other. Notwith-
standing this, the reader (or receiver) cogni-
tively behaves in no different way when read-
ing the stories from the three cases above, 
and RIPHA essentially aims at capturing such 
behavior and its intrinsic uniformity across 
fiction and non-fiction. Narrative practices 
activate the imagination-based phantasmatic 
context, which lacks actuality and concrete-
ness as essential properties; indeed, the met-
aphysical status of the elements inscribed 
within the phantasmatic context may range 
from actuality to impossibility, and this is 
what we can talk about by means of phan-
tasmatic uses of indexicals.  
 
█  A short note against irreducibility 
 
First-person reference is regarded as irre-
ducible,41 that is, the “I” cannot be replaced 
by means of co-referring expressions, such as 
names, definite descriptions, and demonstra-
tives salva veritate. Moreover, the same prob-
lem applies in the context of propositional 
attitudes: considering the statements “I ex-
ist”, and “Nevia Dolcini exists” as assertable 
by me, the latter cannot replace the former, 
as an amnesiac me might know that “I exist”, 
while not knowing that “Nevia Dolcini ex-
ists”. The problem is not solved via replace-
ment of the first-person pronoun with the 
demonstrative expression “this person”. As 
Castañeda puts it, «third-person reference to 
oneself […] is not identical with first-person 
reference to oneself qua oneself».42 This re-
flection applies in all the cases in which the 
“I” achieves its reference through a complex 
semantic-pragmatic operation requiring the 
activation of both the general meaning fixed 
by rules in a language, and the information 
provided by the context of utterance.  
Apparently, it is granted that a self only re-
fers to itself in the first-person way. Let’s ad-
dress this as the principle of Individual Self-
Reference (ISR). According to ISR, only the 
subject in the role of the utterer can refer to 
herself by means of an I-token. Although 
proper names and definite descriptions effec-
tively identify one unique individual, and can 
be used by anyone other than the individual 
they refer to, the first-person pronoun is a lin-
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guistic tool doomed to exclusive individual 
use for self-referential purposes. Yet, ISR does 
not exclude a priori that self-referential mech-
anisms might possibly fail; rather, ISR states 
the positive characteristic of any I-use, name-
ly, that self-reference by means of “I” is exclu-
sively done by a self-referring individual.  
ISR, while trivial at first glance, triggers a 
variety of philosophically relevant questions, 
as it seems to suggest that the first-person 
pronoun enjoys some kind of “ontological pri-
ority” over other names and expressions, given 
that the occurrence of an I-token indicates, at 
least, a category of selves. Or even, echoing 
Peirce’s existential relation, I-tokens may on-
tologically depend on an individual - the ut-
terer or producer - without whom no I-token 
would ever occur. Such reflections widely con-
tribute to the idea that the self is what is re-
ferred to by means of the first-person pro-
noun, even if it is fully unclear what a self ac-
tually is (or if there is one in the first place).  
However, the phantasmatic “I” suspends 
the validity of ISR. Such suspension bears 
some relations to the ideas discussed by Dan-
iel Dennett in The Self as a Center of Narrative 
Gravity.43 While presenting his view of the self 
as an abstract object, a fictional construction 
of theoretical self-interpretation as well as 
other-interpretation, Dennett considers that it 
is an illusion to think of a fictional self (e.g., 
the fictional self the reader attributes to a fic-
tional character such as Mattia Pascal, or Pi-
nocchio) as dependent for its very creation on 
the existence of real selves. The thesis that fic-
tional selves are ontologically dependent on 
real selves is challenged by means of a mental 
experiment involving a novel-writing ma-
chine. As the machine starts to function, it 
produces the first sentence “Call me Gilbert”, 
followed by what appears to be an autobiog-
raphy of the fictional character called Gilbert. 
A self is created, and yet its creator is no self. 
Dennett’s novelist-robot constitutes a coun-
terexample to ISR, and it exemplifies the re-
sistance of the phantasmatic “I” to the princi-
ple. Dennett’s view of the self as something 
belonging to the sphere of the fictional evokes 
the idea that the selves of fictional characters 
and “our” own selves might be regarded as 
placed along a continuum, from which the ref-
erent of the phantasmatic uses of the “I” 
(whatever it is) is selected. 
While imagination is usually considered 
to be a fundamental ingredient in fictional 
practices, phantasmatic deixis and the analy-
sis of the phantasmatic “I” extends its rele-
vance far beyond the terrain of fictional dis-
course. The imagination-oriented deixis and 
its widespread employment in communica-
tion suggest that imagination should be re-
garded as a necessary wheel in the mecha-
nism underlying language tout court. 
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█  Notes 
 
1 This standard list of indexical expressions after 
David Kaplan’s work on the logic of demonstra-
tives can be expanded to include words (or as-
pects of words) that indicate tense, and even plu-
rality. See D. KAPLAN, Afterthoughts, in: J. AL-
MOG, J. PERRY, D. WETTSTEIN (eds.), Themes 
From Kaplan, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1989, pp. 575-614. 
2 Because indexicals resist formalization, some au-
thors (e.g., Rudolf Carnap) have proposed to solve 
the problem by excluding indexicals from the lan-
guage-object of the analysis, which is then limited 
to indexical-free statements (see R. CARNAP, Phi-
losophy and Logical Syntax, Kegan, London 1935). 
However, indexical-free languages do not exist; 
were they to exist, they would be ideal languages 
spoken by disembodied creatures, or angels (see R. 
DE MONTICELLI, Sulla lingua degli angeli, in: «Te-
oria», vol. I, n. 1, 1989, pp. 69-137). 
3 See D. KAPLAN, Demonstratives (1977), in: J. 
ALMOG, J. PERRY, D. WETTSTEIN (eds.), Themes 
From Kaplan, cit., pp. 481-563. 
4 See J. PERRY, Reference and Reflexivity, CSLI 
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Publications, Stanford 2001. 
5 Some authors view ostensive gestures as the 
phylogenetic precursors of indexicals (see M.C. 
CORBALLIS, From Hand to Mouth, the Origins of 
Language, Princeton University Press, Princeton 
2002; M.A. ARBIB, K. LIEBAL, S. PIKA, Primate Vo-
calization, Gesture, and the Evolution of Human 
Language, in: «Current Anthropology», vol. 
XLIX, n. 6, 2008, pp. 1053-1076). From the onto-
genetic perspective, it is noted that pre-linguistic 
children make massive recourse to declarative 
pointing – pointing gestures with a referential 
function – when the goal is to share someone’s 
attention towards an object or event in the sur-
rounding context (see E. BATES, L. CAMAIONI, V. 
VOLTERRA, The Acquisition of Performatives Prior 
to Speech», in: «Merrill-Palmer Quarterly», 21, 
1975, pp. 205-226). The analogy between indexi-
cals and declarative pointing is particularly obvi-
ous in the case of demonstratives; more on the 
functional analogy between linguistic indexicals 
and pointing gestures can be found in N. DOLCI-
NI, Indicali linguistici e gesti indicali, in: D. GAM-
BARARA, A. GIVIGLIANO (a cura di), Origine e 
Sviluppo del Linguaggio tra Teoria e Storia, Arac-
ne, Roma 2009, pp. 303-309.  
6 R. SMULLYAN, Chameleonic Languages, in: «Syn-
these», vol. LX, n. 2, 1984, pp. 201-224, here p. 201. 
7 S. PREDELLI, Indexicality, Intensionality, and Rel-
ativist Post-semantics, in: «Synthese», vol. 
CLXXXIV, n. 2, 2012, pp. 121-136, here 127. 
8 Some authors consider the non-ambiguity of the 
“I”, along with “now” and “here”, as well as the 
fact that they can’t be vacuous, to be a reason for 
concluding that the category of indexicals is se-
mantically non-homogeneous. Kaplan (see D. 
KAPLAN, Demostratives, cit.) notably distinguishes 
between pure indexicals (“I”, “here”, “now”) and 
demonstratives (“this”, “that”…), where the latter 
yet not the former need some other contextual 
features - pointing gestures or directing inten-
tions (see D. KAPLAN, Afterthoughts, cit.) – to dis-
ambiguate their reference. Perry reviews Kaplan’s 
distinction in the light of the notions of “automa-
ticity” and “intentionality”, so that pure indexicals 
and demonstratives are renamed “automatic in-
dexicals” and “intentional indexicals”, respective-
ly (see J. PERRY, Indexicals and Demonstratives, in: 
R. HALE, C. WRIGHT (eds.), Companion to the 
Philosophy of Language, Oxford, Blackwell Pub-
lishers Inc., Oxford 1997, pp. 1-31).  
9 The target of the criticism extends beyond the 
 
 
first person pronoun to include, in particular, the 
(pure) indexicals “now” and “here”. The Answering 
Machine Paradox presented by Allan Sidelle is a 
good example of a problematic case challenging the 
traditional account: if “now” refers to the time in 
which the “now”-token is uttered, then what if the 
“now”-token occurs in “I am not here now” when 
played on an answering machine? (See A. SIDELLE, 
The Answering Machine Paradox, in: «Canadian 
Journal of Philosophy», vol. LXXXI, n. 4, 1991, pp. 
525-539). Other non-standard uses of indexicals 
include the case of a machine which automatically 
prints a token “I am hot” when it gets hot, two in-
dividuals who write a letter together using the first-
person pronoun, etc. (See F. ORILIA, Singular Refer-
ence: A Descriptivist Perspective, Springer, Dor-
drecht 2010, in particular pp. 169-191). 
10 Quentin Smith’s thesis that the reference-fixing 
rule of an indexical is variable (see Q. SMITH,  The 
Multiple Uses of Indexicals, in: «Synthese», vol. 
LXXVIII, n. 2, 1989, pp. 167-191), offers a para-
digmatic instance of radical disagreement with the 
Kaplanian accounts of indexical reference. Authors 
endorsing a view compatible with the standard 
model of indexicals, usually attempt to review it so 
as to accommodate cases in which the so-called 
pure indexicals “I”, “now”, and “here” fail to refer 
to the utterer, time, and space of the indexical-
token. For example, Stefano Predelli (see S. PRE-
DELLI, I am not here now, in: «Analysis», vol. 
LVIII, n. 2, 1998, pp. 107-115) integrates the mod-
el with an intentionally specified context, which 
might differ from the context of utterance, whereas 
Corazza, Fish, and Gorvett provide an alternative 
account in which the contextual parameter is con-
ventionally given (see E. CORAZZA, W. FISH, J. 
GORVETT, Who is I?, in: «Philosophical Studies», 
vol. CVII, 2002, pp. 1-21). 
11 The literature on fictional names is extremely 
rich, as documented by the numerous debates in 
analytic aesthetics. Sometimes, the discussion is 
more directly concerned with the referential is-
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tion contexts (see E. CORAZZA, M. WHITSEY, In-
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these», vol. CLIII, n. 1, 2006, pp. 23-47). 
12 For example, Schlenker ramifies the notion of 
context of speech into a Context of Thought and a 
Context of Utterance so as to accommodate data 
from free indirect discourse and the historical pre-
sent, as well as to account for the different contexts 
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P. SCHLENKER, Context of Thought and Context of 
Utterance: A Note on Free Indirect Discourse and the 
Historical Present, in: «Mind and Language», vol. 
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funktion der Sprache, Fischer, Jena 1934 (Eng. 
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Function of Language, John Benjamins Publishing 
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indexicals rests on the idea that «the concrete 
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ing there motionless» (K. BÜHLER, Theory of Lan-
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being a complex human act. Communicative 
events and indexical utterances are regarded as oc-
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every social undertaking, and the concrete speech 
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model of verbal communication» (ibidem).  
20 For a discussion of the anaphoric uses of index-
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D. KAPLAN, Afterthoughts, cit.; G. CHIERCHIA, 
Anaphora and Dynamic Binding, in: «Linguistics 
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S. NEALE, Pragmatics and Binding, in: Z.G. SZABO 
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ty Press, Oxford 2005, pp. 165-285. 
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ed by Bühler (see K. BÜHLER, Theory of Language, 
cit., pp. 117-136) as «a coordinate system of 
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Gustav Bergmann’s Realism (see G. BERGMANN, 
Realism. A Critique of Brentano and Meinong, Uni-
versity of Wisconsin Press, Madison 1967).  
27 By “imagination”, I here broadly intend the 
human ability to mentally represent something, as 
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as, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and philoso-
phy of mind) that the topic cannot be properly 
addressed within the limited scope of the present 
work. For an updated overview of the relevant 
debates on imagination, see A. KIND (ed.), The 
Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination, 
Routledge, London/New York 2016.  
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might be the same (e.g., face-to-face communica-
tion), differ only in time (e.g., graffiti) or only in 
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exemplified by Kaplan’s account of indexicals. 
36 Kaplan revises Reichenbach’s original proposal 
about indexical token-reflexivity by arguing that 
occurrences are better fit than tokens to meet the 
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